For all the talk about the collapse of the EU Constitution (and in some quarters of its stealthy implementation) it is easy to forget that the work of the European Union is still going on in many areas. One of the potentially most fruitful and positive of these is the Lisbon strategy, that was launched with much fanfare in 2000 and later re-branded after it became apparent that the lofty but rather vague goals set down in the original document were not being implemented. We have now had five full years of the Lisbon strategy, a landmark that is being marked in various corners with a slew of analyses of exactly how well the project has done so far. While I would not put myself at the front of any (metaphorical) choir to sing the praises of the Lisbon strategy to date, some new research does shed light on why the way in which the programme now operates could provide a model for EU operation in general.
An initial look at the achievements of the Lisbon agenda is unlikely to fill the heart of a free market liberal with joy. Germany has just endured one of its most wide ranging strikes in recent memory while the last few days have seen French riot police battling with students on the streets of Paris. These events do not imply the glorious birth of the ‘world’s most dynamic knowledge-based economy.’ Yet, as a recent report by Jean Pisani-Ferry and Andre Sapir of the think-tank Breugel argues, the principle of Lisbon cannot be dismissed out of hand. The idea behind the strategy is to encourage EU member states to learn from each other how to tackle the weaknesses in their economies while benefiting from the sharing of new knowledge and expertise. The role of the EU in this, at least as envisaged in the reformed Lisbon strategy, is to empower governments to put the Lisbon goal that they draw up into practice.
Messers Pisani-Ferry and Sapir are correct to argue that as yet the Commission has failed to do enough to ‘facilitate’ this process and that they should make clearer the specific goals that each country needs to achieve, but the broad concept that they outline – an EU that enables rather than commands member states to act – is a positive vision for how European co-operation could develop, instead of the current sclerotic, dirigiste model that retains such a hold over many EU institutions. When Alan Milward argued some years ago that the European Community had ‘rescued’ the nation state, he was widely decried for misrepresenting the integrationist nature of the European project. While his critics may have been correct, the kernel of his argument – that the EU allows member states to force changes that they do not have the political will to make otherwise – does have a continuing resonance. Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso was on the right track when he recently highlighted the 'European dimension' of successful economic reform. If the Commission can succeed in using the Lisbon agenda to help member states like France and Germany that are now struggling with painful reforms, then it should be cautiously encouraged. But, it will have to work as an agent of national governments rather than as the director of a supranational five-year plan, if this is to succeed politically.