Civitas

Opponents of the deal claim to allow it would present the US with a real risk to homeland security. They claim the assets are too strategically important to be allowed to fall into the hands of a company all too vulnerable to infiltration by radical Islamists bent on attacking America.

The deal’s supporters deny there to be any security risk, basing their claim on two grounds. First, they claim, the UAE is a staunch ally of the USA in its War on Terror and therefore a country whom America can trust. Second, they point out, the ports would themselves remain the property of various US government corporate bodies, and responsibility for their policing wuld remain the exclusive preserve of local authorities, US customs, the US Coast Guard, and Homeland Security.

Furthermore, they argue, to veto the deal would only antagonise the UAE and thereby weaken the strength of its alliance with the US, as well as discourage badly-needed foreign investment to the US, and generally undermine the every ever desirable and peace-creating ideal of international free-trade and commerce.

The objections against the deal and postive arguments for it are worthy of more consideration than they have to date received in the British media and blogo-spehere.

Consider, the security issue first. There are two reasons for being less than fully satisfied by the reassurances those in favour of the deal offer for thinking it would not increase the risk of Islamist terror strikes against the US homeland.

First, whilst it is true that responsibility for security and policing of the ports will remain the exclusive preserve of the US authorities, should the Dubai-based company Dubai Ports World (DPW) gain control of the US terminals the risk of terror strikes in the US would certainly increase as a result. This is because its acquistion of the terminals will have made it much easier for radical Islamists to infiltrate the terminals with cells of Islamist sympathisers and active collaborators who would be ready, willing, and much more easily able than before to use the terminals to receive and warehouse WMD, as well as learn about US security arrangements.

Opponents of the deal claim that to allow it would pose a real risk to US homeland security. The assets, they claim, are too strategically important to be allowed to fall into the hands of a company that would be all too vulnerable to infiltration by radical Islamists bent on attacking America.

Supporters of the deal deny it poses any security risk, basing that denial on two arguments. First, they claim, the UAE is a staunch ally of the USA in its War on Terror and therefore a country whom America can trust. Second, they point out, the ports themselves would remain the property of various US government corporate bodies, and responsibility for their policing would stay the exclusive preserve of US local authorities, customs, Coast Guard and Homeland Security.

Furthermore, supporters of the deal go on to argue in its favour, to veto it would only disappoint and antagonise the UAE and thereby weaken the alliance the US has with it, in addition to deterring other foreign corporations from investing in the US, thereby undermining the always desirable and peace-creating goal of international free-trade and commerce.

The objections that supporters of the deal level against its being vetoed, as well as their positive arguments on its behalf, merit closer scrutiny than they have yet received to date in the British media and blogo-sphere.

On this aspect of the matter, there is an enormously instructive posting on the Counterterrorism Blog of 27 February by Dr Walid Phares, Professor of Middle East Studies and Ethnic and Religious Conflict at Florida Atlantic University and author of the recently published book, Future Jihad: Terrorist Strategies Against America.

Professor Phares points out that the risk of radical Islamist penetration and infiltration of the terminals would increase, should DPW acquire control of them, because, having its headquarters in Dubai, would render those ultimately in charge of the company easily vulnerable to becoming the targets of Takfir – the Islamist doctrine that allows Muslims who cooperate with infidels to be considered equally fair game and targets. Should DPW acquire the US terminals, he argues, there is every liklihood that Islamists would seize the opportunity to subject those with ultimate control of the company to intimidation and blackmail so as to begin the process of infiltrating the terminals with their own people.

Not that those within the federation of Muslim monarchies that make up the UAE and who have ultimate control over DPW would necessarily need that much persuading by Islamists to let the terminals become infiltrated by those with radical Islamist sympathies. This is the second reason for doubting that the acquisition of the terminals by DPW would not pose any security risk to the US.

On this subjct, there is an extremely interesting posting on the Frontpage website for 1 March, written by Paul Sperry, media fellow at the Hoover Institute and author of the 2005 book, Infiltration: How Muslim Spies and Subversives have Penetrated Washington.

In his posting, Sperry makes clear just how deeply suspect DPW must remain. He explains that the company’s US-based executives report to the emir of Dubai who has a controlling interest in the company. The emir, General Sheik Mohammed Bin Rashid Al-Maktoum, also doubles as the UAE’s minister of defence. Before September 11th 2001, claims Sperry, Sheik Maktoum authorised ‘UAE military C-130 cargo planes to supply al-Qaida hunting camps in Afghanistan with all the amenities they needed when he and other high-level UAE officials and princes took hunting trips there’.

On one of these trip in 1999, Sperry further claims, half the royal family of the UAE were guests of Osama bin Laden at his camp near Kandahar and flew in there on an official UAE aircraft. ‘This was’ states Sperry ‘ just two months after bin Laden blew up the two US embassies in Africa (a plot which was financed in part through Dubai banks), so they knew they were in bad company.’

Sperry further points out that 13 of the 19 who took part in the ‘plane hi-jackings [of 9/11] flew into the US from Dubai, as did the twentieth who never made it onto the aircraft. Two of these were Emirates, and the one who flew the plane that struck the South Tower had served under the Sheik.

‘Guilt by association’ you might claim dismissively.

But the case for supposing UAE’s acquisition of the US port terminals would increase the security risk to America is considerably strengthened by Sperry's observation that two weeks after 9/11 ‘Sheik Maktoum warned Washington not to attack “innocent” Muslims in Afghanistan and to instead focus on… [as] the only real terrorists” --guess who? You’ve got it: “Israelite terrorists”.

After documenting other alleged facts about the Sheik, which, if correct, would add further grounds for doubting that the risk to US security would not increase if the US port terminals were entrusted to a company whose CEO answered to Sheik Maktoum, Sperry offers some information about DPW's CEO which further adds to the security case against allowing the deal. The CEO of DPW is Mohammed Sharaf who, claims Sperry, ‘studied in Arizona in the early 1990’s at the same time al-Qaida was setting up an American beachhead there. Several prominent al-Qaida leaders emerged from the Arizona university system’, as did one of the 9/11 pilots, Hani Hanjour.

Sperry reminds readers that it was from Phoenix that the FBI in Washington received a memo shortly before the plane hi-jackings from an operative based there who warned the agency ‘of the possibility of a coordinated effort by Bin Laden to send students to the United States to attend civil aviation universities and colleges’.

Sperry rightly suggests that whichever FBI agent sent that memo might well be able to advise the Federal government of what links, if any, Sharaf might have had as a student with al-Qaida-sponsored students at the Arizona University at which he was studying in the early 90’s.

Finally, just to round off the security equation, Sperry adds three further interesting facts about the UAE's security rating in the US. First, it is one of 35 countries (all Muslim) that the US Border Patrol has designated a “special interest country”. Second, it shows up on the US Customs and Border Protection Intelligence and National Targetting Center’s list of 69 “countries of interest for potential terrorist activities”. Third, the UAE is one of only five countries in which the US Department for Homeland Security has stationed Visa Security Officers, suggesting it has misgivings about its reliability as an ally in the War on Terror.

We turn now to the arguments of those who claim any veto of the deal would be protectionist in the economic sense and thereby inimical to economic liberty. Here, it is worth remembering that neither of the two greatest apostles of economic liberalism -- Adam Smith and Ludwig von Mises -- were out and out exponents of laissez faire where considerations of national security were at stake.

In discussing which goods and services a state may and should provide, and which it should leave to be provided, if at all, by the market and other institutions of civil society, Smith identified three morally legitimate functions of the state of which two relate to the provision of personal and national security. These are ‘protecting … society from the violence and invasion of other independent societies… [and] protecting as far as possible every member of society from the injustice or oppression of every other member, or… [in other words] of establishing an exact administration of justice’. The third function of the state Smith considered legitimate was to ‘erect and maintain certain public works and certain public institutions …’ , among which Smith expressly includes ‘good roads, bridges, navigable, canals, [and] harbours.’ [Adam Smith, Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, first published 1776, (eds. ) R.H.Campbell and A.S.Skinner (Indianopolis:Liberty Fund, 1981) IV lx .51 and IV.i.Part iii, 1)].

Given what is at stake, it is by no means clear, Smith would have favoured the terminals coming under the control of the UAE state-owned company.

In the case of Mises, there is even greater textual warrant for supposing he too would equally have opposed the UAE takeover of the US port terminals on grounds of national security. In 1944, as the Second World War was drawing to a close and people’s thoughts increasingly turned to post-war reconstruction, Mises delivered the following fateful warning to the West which has especial resonance today in light of DPW's attempt to acquire the US port terminals. He wrote:

‘ It would be a fateful mistake to assume that a return to the policies of liberalism abandoned by the civilised nations some decades ago could cure the [present] evils and open the way towards peaceful cooperation of nations… [T]he years of antagonism … have engendered hatreds which can vanish only in centuries.

‘Under present conditions the adoption of a policy of outright laissez faire and laissez passer on the part of the civilised nations of the West would be equivalent to an unconditional surrender to the totalitarians nations.

‘The most that can be expected for the immediate future is the separation of the world into two sections: a liberal democratic and capitalist West with about one quarter of the total population, and a militarist and totalitarian East embracing the greater part of the earth’s surface and population.’
[Ludwig von Mises, Omnipotent Government: The Rise of the Total State and Total War (Spring Mills, PA: Libertarian Press, 1969), pp.10-11]

Again, had Mises been alive today, I am certain he would advocated that the federal government veto DPW's acquisition of the US terminals, a sentiment I would be the first to propose a toast on behalf of -- in something more suitable than port!