Rule Britannia revisited
Civitas, 23 September 2009
In a recent article published by the Times columnist William Rees-Mogg (‘Rule Britannia?’), the Lisbon Treaty was given full exposure as a direct threat to Britain’s constitutional integrity, writes Ahmed Mehdi. Mogg argued that Lisbon would ‘in effect repeal all the main legal safeguards of British liberties … including the sovereignty of parliament, habeas corpus and magna carta.’
It is almost certainly true that if Lisbon is ratified by Ireland on October 2nd, there will be an unforgettable mental register of worries that afflict Europeans of various political shades. Firstly, it needs to be said that British attitudes towards Europe are undoubtedly affected by its own peculiar constitution. Upon entry into the EU, Britain had to make more adjustments than any other country in the European community largely because its political, taxation, agricultural, and energy systems were different. However, the greatest difficulty and one which may prove to be the most intractable for any political party – Labour or Conservative – is the S-word: sovereignty, both national and parliamentary.
The six founders had to rethink their preconditions of constitutional and political sovereignty quite frequently, unlike Britain which had an entrenched constitution. The constitutions in European countries have undergone several reincarnations in the twentieth century, while the British concentrated on its own constitution, emphasising procedures rather than the substance. In effect, whether or not the Lisbon Treaty is ratified on 2nd October, the intractability of the ‘Sovereignty question’ in British political circles will not fade away. To be in the EU for some countries is a badge of democratic acceptance. This was the case for countries like Portugal, Spain and Central European states. But other states have entered the Union for other reasons, like economic integration. The British find EU institutions the most alien of all. There is a shift of power to the institutions, especially the judicial arm. The judicial review of European legislation has been especially difficult for Britain in its understanding of the process. In this light, the main threat of the Lisbon Treaty lies in the fact that the EU will be able to propose laws in areas that have hitherto been the preserve of national governments and agreed by way of inter-governmental negotiation. For example, Phillip Johnston of the Daily Telegraph has said that:
‘The Treaty transfers 105 new “competencies” from the national to the EU level, covering policy areas including foreign, security, defence, trade, justice and economic policy, the single largest transfer of powers in the history of the European Union. ’
Furthermore, the Lisbon Treaty itself is not a visionary Treaty: it contains no grand project, such as the euro or enlargement to the east, nor does it outline future plans for battling climate change. It is a complicated treaty largely riddled with phrases about managing the EU decision-making process, aiming to avoid bureaucratic excrescence. Nevertheless, we should be wary of outright dismissal: rejection by the Irish on October 2nd could have devastating implications. The demise of the Lisbon treaty would have far-reaching implications. The French president, Nicolas Sarkozy, and the German chancellor, Angela Merkel, have made it clear that there can be no further EU enlargement unless and until the treaty is ratified. Ultimately however the EU has a long way to go from here. If rejected, we could be stuck with the Nice Treaty for another decade. If accepted, the Lisbon Treaty may be with us for a very long time indeed. Yes or No, the Lisbon Treaty has invariably re-invited what Isaiah Berlin once called the ‘cinderalla complex’: there is a shoe in the shape of the EU, but no foot to fit it.